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JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S NEW BUSINESS RESCUE 
MODEL: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
Patrick C. Osode 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most exciting and innovative aspects of South 
Africa’s New Companies Act1 (“the 2008 Companies Act” or “the 
Act”) is the creation of a new business rescue model in Chapter Six of 
the Act (“Chapter Six”). The scheme of Chapter Six of the 2008 
Companies Act2 replaces the judicial management model that was 
contained in the 1973 Companies Act,3 which is the predecessor of the 
current Act. Like most major pieces of legislation enacted in post-
apartheid South Africa, the 2008 Companies Act in general, and 
Chapter Six in particular, are intended by the legislature to significantly 
enlarge the capacities of both the government and the private sector 
                                                 
 This is the revised version of a paper presented at the 17th Biennial 
Meeting of the International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law (IACCL) 
held at Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey from July 16-19, 2014. Excellent research 
assistance received from Melissa A.A. Omino, doctoral candidate, University of Fort 
Hare, is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any error or omission remains 
exclusively mine. 
 LLB (Hons); BL; LLM; SJD. Professor and Head, Department of 
Mercantile Law, University of Fort Hare, South Africa.  
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (S. Afr.). Unless otherwise indicated, all 
references to statutory provisions are references to provisions of this Act. Although 
enacted in 2008, the Act only came into force on May 1, 2011. Pursuant to powers 
conferred under the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry has enacted The 
Companies Regulations, 2011 which are expected to assist both the application and 
implementation. See GN R351 in GG 34239 of 26 April 2011 (S. Afr.). 
2 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.). 
3 Companies Act 61 of 1973 (S. Afr.). The 1973 Companies Act has now 
been repealed by the 2008 Companies Act. 
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to preserve existing jobs, create new employment opportunities, and 
make the country’s economy competitive relative to its 
contemporaries.4 But beyond the purely economic policy objectives, 
the 2008 Companies Act was also intended to infuse the regulatory 
framework governing companies with the treasured democratic values 
of equality, non-racialism, and human dignity enshrined in South 
Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution.5 
The fact that both social and economic objectives impelled the 
enactment of the 2008 Companies Act and Chapter Six can be gleaned 
from the twelve objects of the Act set out in section 7. With particular 
respect to Chapter Six, it is specifically stated that part of the policy 
intent behind the enactment of the Act is “to provide for the efficient 
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner 
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.”6 
Especially significant is the provision of section 5(1) of the 2008 
Companies Act, which explicitly enjoins the courts to interpret and 
apply the provisions of the Act in a manner that gives effect to the 
purposes set out in section 7. Based on the provisions of sections 5, 7, 
and Chapter Six, both judges and academics7 are in agreement that the 
legislature has unequivocally signalled its preference for the rescue of 
financially distressed companies as against liquidation.8 Both the 2008 
Companies Act and Chapter Six constitute another glaring example of 
South Africa’s attempt to use commercial legal regulatory instruments 
                                                 
4   SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES 
FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, ¶ 1.2 (2004), available at 
http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/26493_gen1183a.pdf. 
5 S. AFR. CONST., 2008. 
6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). 
7 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW 861-64 (Farouk H.I. Cassim et al. eds., 
2d ed. 2012); 1 HENOCHSBERG ON THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 44-46 (Piet 
Delport et al. eds. 2012) [hereinafter “DELPORT”]. 
8 This point was made most distinctly by the court in Koen and Another v. 
Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. 
Afr.) as follows: “It is clear that the Legislature has recognised that the liquidation of 
companies more frequently than not occasions significant collateral damage, both 
economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is 
obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse 
socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible. Business 
rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed at 
avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations . . . .”  
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to boost socio-economic transformation by creating conditions that 
will enable significantly increased participation of the formerly 
disenfranchised black majority in the mainstream economy. These 
reforms will help the society overcome the multiple legacies of 
apartheid with which South Africa continues to struggle twenty years 
into the democratic era. 
The quality of real or tangible outcomes achieved by statutory 
regulatory instruments generally, and commercial law-related 
instruments in particular, may depend in part on their interpretation 
and application by the courts.9 To be sure, the adoption of an 
interpretive approach that is conservative, largely textual or literal, and 
purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of Chapter 
Six achieving the public policy goals intended by law and policymakers. 
Indeed, such an approach may by itself lead to regulatory failure.10 The 
plausibility of this concern is clearly borne out by the experience of 
“judicial management” in the courts. In this respect, it is especially 
noteworthy that virtually all of the academic and judicial post-mortem 
done on the judicial management scheme of the 1973 Companies Act 
suggest that one of the main reasons for the dismal failure of that 
scheme was the conservative judicial approach to the interpretation 
and application of the requirement of “reasonable probability” (of 
successful financial rehabilitation of the debtor company), which was 
a prerequisite for the granting of a judicial management order under 
section 417 of that Act.11 The risk of business rescue suffering the same 
                                                 
9   COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 378-79 
(Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds. 2013). 
10 Such failure would almost certainly become reality if the courts adopt a 
disposition and develop a jurisprudence that is generally “creditor-friendly,” as was 
the case in the judicial management era and as is still the case under the country’s 
insolvency law and related processes. It should be noted here that judicial 
management was first introduced into South African law through the Companies Act 
of 1926 and only became consigned to history when the 2008 Companies Act came 
into force. See Richard Bradstreet, The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?, 
128 SALJ 352, 353-56 (2011); Anneli Loubser, The Role of Shareholders during Corporate 
Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking In?, 20 SAMLJ 372, 372-73 (2008). 
11 See, e.g., David Burdette, Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern 
and Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), 16 SAMLJ 249 (2004); 
CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 2; Pieter Kloppers, Judicial 
Management Reform – Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue, 13 SAMLJ 358 (2001); Koen and 
Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at 2 
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fate in the courts as its judicial management predecessor is significantly 
heightened by the deficiencies of the 2008 Companies Act generally 
and of Chapter Six in particular.12 
Against the above background, it is clear that the interpretive 
approach and attitude of the courts will be critical to the efficacy of the 
Chapter Six rescue mechanism and, therefore, to the attainment of the 
underlying public policy objectives. Without doubt, if they adopt an 
                                                 
(S. Afr.); Anneli Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South 
African Corporate Law, 16 SAMLJ 137 (2004); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others 
v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); Propspec 
Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.). Other 
factors that have been identified include the absence of a business rescue culture 
among all the various role players (creditors, judges, etc.) and the fact that judicial 
managers were usually chosen from the ranks of liquidators who have neither the 
skill nor experience in rehabilitating businesses. See Richard Bradstreet, The Leak in 
the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners May Adversely 
Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy, 22 SAMLJ 195, 195 (2010). It 
would seem that there were also historical factors that lay behind the spectacular 
impotence and ultimate failure of judicial management. See Anneli Loubser, Tilting 
at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, 25 
SAMLJ 437, 438 (2011). 
12 In this respect, the following points are noteworthy. First, consisting of 
a total of 225 sections and 5 schedules, the 2008 Companies Act is about the shortest 
contemporary companies’ legislation. It can in this respect be sharply contrasted with 
the United Kingdom 2006 Companies Act, which consists of 1300 sections and 16 
schedules; Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 made up of 1516 sections and 4 
schedules; Hong Kong’s Companies Ordinance 2012, which consists of 921 sections 
and 11 schedules; and India’s Companies Act 2013 consisting of 470 sections and 7 
schedules. However, the interpretation and application of the Act is supported by 
the Companies Regulations of 2011 made by the Minister of Trade and Industry 
pursuant to powers conferred by Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 223 (S. Afr.). As 
already pointed out by some academic commentators and as the emerging case law 
is beginning to show, the result of this extreme minimalist approach and economy 
of content is that several important issues of company law are either not covered at 
all or are addressed in significantly inadequate detail. See CONTEMPORARY COMPANY 
LAW, supra note 7, at 2; PIET DELPORT, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT MANUAL 3-4 
(2009); Loubser, Judicial Management as a Business Rescue Procedure in South African 
Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 137. Second, the deficit in the width of regulatory 
coverage is exacerbated by the poor quality of legislative drafting apparent in several 
parts of the 2008 Companies Act. This has already been the subject of judicial 
lamentation in the emerging case law. See also DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and 
Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.) and Tuning Fork Ltd. t/a Balanced Audio v. Greeff and 
Another 2014 (4) SA 521, ¶ 90 (S. Afr.). 
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approach and attitude similar to that which was consistently visited on 
“judicial management,” there is a real likelihood that the rescue 
mechanism will fail at the judicial altar. Cognisant of this possibility, 
this paper examines some of the Chapter Six related decisions and 
pronouncements made by South African courts in the last three years, 
with a view to assessing the practical or policy implications of those 
decisions and pronouncements. The analysis will determine whether 
the decisions are ultimately favourable to the emergence of Chapter 
Six as an effective corporate rescue mechanism in South Africa. 
I.         BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF SOUTH 
AFRICA’S CORPORATE RESCUE MODEL 
The scheme of Chapter Six can be activated in either one of 
two ways. The first is by way of a resolution adopted by the board of 
directors of a “financially distressed company” where the directors 
genuinely believe that the company is “financially distressed”13 and that 
there is a reasonable prospect of rescue.14 Alternatively, where the 
board of such a company appears reluctant to adopt such a resolution, 
and thereby activates business rescue proceedings voluntarily, any 
“affected person”15 may apply to the court for an order placing the 
                                                 
13 In terms of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(f) (S. Afr.), a company 
is “financially distressed” if, within the immediately ensuing six-month period, (a) it 
appears reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as 
they become due and payable; or (b) it appears reasonably likely that the company 
will become insolvent.  
14 “Rescuing a company” is defined as the achievement of either one of 
two goals, namely, (a) the restructuring of the affairs, business, property, equity, debt, 
and other liabilities of a financially distressed company in a manner that maximizes 
the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, (b) if it 
is not possible for the company to continue in existence, results in a better return to 
the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate 
liquidation of the company. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(b)(iii), 128(1)(h) 
(S. Afr.). 
15 In relation to a company, the term “affected person” refers to the 
shareholders or creditors, trade unions representing the company’s employees, the 
employees themselves, or their representatives where they are not represented by a 
trade union. See Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 128(1)(a), 144 (S. Afr.). The 
recognition of trade unions and employees and the vesting of significant rights on 
them in the corporate rescue context is one of the innovations introduced by the 
2008 Companies Act and is consistent with South African law and policymakers’ 
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company under rescue.16 Irrespective of how the proceedings are 
commenced, the first major consequence is that the business and 
affairs are placed under the supervision and control of a “business 
rescue practitioner” to whom all the “affected persons” must now look 
for the possible rehabilitation of the company.17 
The second major legal consequence flowing from the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings is the moratorium on 
legal proceedings, executions, and claims (secured and unsecured) 
against the company.18 This effectively insulates a company undergoing 
rescue from legal or enforcement proceedings either pending or in 
prospect.19 The moratorium, which is general in its reach, arises both 
immediately and automatically upon the proper commencement of the 
said proceedings.20 While the effect of the moratorium does not extend 
to an alteration of existing rights acquired by the company’s creditors 
in the period preceding business rescue, it does effectively freeze those 
rights “in the sense that creditors may not enforce their rights while 
the company is under the rescue process without the written consent 
of the business rescue practitioner or in certain circumstances, the 
court[.]”21 
                                                 
conviction that these particular stakeholders deserve stronger protection in processes 
and transactions aimed at resolving challenges posed by financially distressed 
employers. See CARL STEIN & GEOFF EVERINGHAM, THE NEW COMPANIES ACT 
UNLOCKED 411 (2011). 
16   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 129(1) (S. Afr.). 
17 In this respect, although the South African business rescue scheme 
shares several features with the famous 11 U.S.C. § 1101 corporate bankruptcy 
management regime, it also differs sharply in that it adopts what Professor 
McCormack has described as a “management displacement model” when compared 
to the “debtor-in-possession” model of 11 U.S.C. § 1101. See GERARD MCCORMACK, 
CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 80-83, 152-54 
(2008). See also CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861, 866; STEIN & 
EVERINGHAM, supra note 15, at 409. 
18 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 133 (S. Afr.). 
19 This feature appears common to most of the corporate rescue schemes 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions. MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 156-175. 
20   CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 878-79. 
21 Id. 878-79. In the recent case of Moodley v. On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd. 2014 
(6) SA 279 (GJ) (S. Afr.), the court held that the scope of the said general moratorium 
does not extend to legal proceedings brought against a company under business 
rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the rescue plan, 
2015 Osode 4:1 
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Perhaps the most crucial part of the business rescue process 
consists of the development, approval, and implementation of a 
competent rescue plan.22 Inevitably, exclusive responsibility for this 
part of the process is imposed on the practitioner who must begin his 
tenure by simultaneously investigating the company’s affairs and 
consulting with the creditors, management, employees or their trade 
unions, and other stakeholders.23 Following development of the plan, 
it must be presented for approval of the creditors at a meeting which 
is also open to participation by other groups of “affected persons.”24 
A rescue plan is only “approved” if it is supported by seventy-five 
percent of the creditors out of which fifty percent must be claimants 
who qualify as “independent creditors.”25 Implementation of the plan 
can only be properly embarked upon by the business rescue 
practitioner if approval has been given in accordance with the 
requirements of the 2008 Companies Act.26 If the required level of 
creditor support for the plan is not received, the rescue proceedings 
automatically terminate, unless the practitioner or an “affected person” 
pursues the very limited recourse available to him under the Act.27 
                                                 
including its interpretation and execution towards implementation. In reaching this 
decision, the court declined to follow an earlier high court decision to the contrary 
handed down in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd. v. Marsden No and Others 2013 
ZAGPJHC 148 (GSJ) (S. Afr.).  
22   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1) (S. Afr.).  
23   Id. § 141(1). However, there is an obligation imposed on directors by 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 142 (S. Afr.) to provide assistance and cooperation to 
the business rescue practitioner. 
24 Id. § 152 (S. Afr.). For a detailed discussion of the various stakeholders’ 
participatory rights, see CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 899-905; 
and DELPORT, supra note 7, at 500-14. 
25 The term “independent creditor” is defined by Companies Act 71 of 
2008 § 128(1)(g) (S. Afr.) as a creditor, including an employee, who is not related to 
the debtor company. It specifically excludes the company’s directors as well as the 
business rescue practitioner. 
26 Id. § 152(5), (6). These provisions impose a mandatory obligation on the 
debtor company, under the direction of the business rescue practitioner, to take all 
steps necessary to satisfy any conditions on which the rescue plan is contingent and 
to implement the plan. 
27 Where a plan is rejected by the creditors, there are essentially two 
options available under Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1) (S. Afr.). The first is for 
either the business rescue practitioner or an “affected person” to make an application 
to court for an order setting aside the creditors’ negative vote on the basis that it was 
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II.         ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE 
Since the 2008 Companies Act came into operation on the May 
1, 2011, there have been no less than fifteen reported judicial decisions 
on business rescue applications and resulting or related proceedings. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is especially significant that business 
rescue appears to have been granted in only one of the cases that have 
come before the courts.28 Consistent with sound judicial practice, the 
courts have taken the opportunity in each case to make decisions and 
pronouncements on several questions pivotal in the context of the 
interpretation, application, and implementation of Chapter Six. In the 
discussion that follows below, this paper discusses the judicial 
decisions and pronouncements on some of those questions. 
A.         What Constitutes a “Reasonable Prospect of Rescue” 
The most recurring questions in the emerging case law pertain 
to the provision empowering a court to grant an order, at the behest 
of an “affected person,” placing a company under business rescue 
where, inter alia, “there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the 
company.”29 Not surprisingly, this provision also featured prominently 
in the two cases on business rescue that have thus far reached the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”).30 The first question that the courts 
have had to confront in this context, is as to what exactly the legislature 
meant by the words “reasonable prospect of rescue.” Indeed, most of 
the applications for business rescue made thus far have failed mainly 
on the ground that the applicants were unable to meet the evidentiary 
                                                 
“inappropriate.” The second option is for an “affected person” or “combination of 
affected persons” to make an offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more 
of the opposing creditors at a value independently and expertly determined to be a 
fair and reasonable estimate of the return to the said creditor(s) if the company were 
to be liquidated. 
28 That solitary case is African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.). 
29 Id. § 131(4)(a). 
30 See Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) 
Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.); and the very recent (and yet to be reported) 
decision in Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 
162. The SCA of South Africa is the highest court in South Africa for all matters 
except those raising constitutional questions for which the Constitutional Court 
(where the Chief Justice sits) is the apex court. 
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burden implicit in this requirement.31 For supporters and enthusiasts 
of business rescue in South Africa, these “pioneering” High Court and 
SCA judgments32 must be troubling, partly because of the 
overwhelmingly negative findings and conclusions which point to the 
possibility that the courts might be unwittingly setting the bar too high 
for the applicants and in the process unfairly denying access to the 
remedial potential of the Chapter Six statutory scheme for financially 
distressed companies and their stakeholders.33 In this regard the 
decision in Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd.34 stands out. Here the court began the articulation 
of the basis for its decision by noting that the 2008 Companies Act 
clearly requires something less than that the debtor company’s 
rehabilitation should be a reasonable probability. This, in the court’s 
view, is an inference that must be drawn from the difference in 
language between the 1973 Companies Act which used the words 
“reasonable probability” in its s 417 and the 2008 Companies Act 
where the words used in section 131(4) are “reasonable prospect”. In 
other words, the legislature must have intended to set the rehabilitation 
bar at a level lower than that prescribed under the 1973 Companies 
Act. The court was especially critical of the judicial approach to 
applications for “judicial management” when it stated that, “the 
mindset reflected in various cases dealing with judicial management 
                                                 
31 See E.P. Joubert, “Reasonable Possibility” versus “Reasonable Prospect”: Did 
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a Better Test than Judicial Management?, 76 J. Contemp. 
Roman-Dutch L. 550, 562 (2013) (observing that, based on the recent case law, “the 
single most problematic factor that stands in the way of the granting of business 
rescue orders, is the uncertainty experienced by the courts regarding the meaning of 
‘reasonable prospect.’”). 
32 See Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors Intervening) 
2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa 
(Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.); Engen Petroleum Ltd. v. Multi Waste (Pty) 
Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 596 (S. Afr.); Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd. v. Pinnacle Point 
Group Ltd. and Another, (Advantage Projects Managers) (Pty) Ltd. Intervening 2011 (5) SA 
600 (S. Afr.); Essa and Another v. Bestvest and Another 2012 (4) SA 103; Investec Bank Ltd. 
v. Bruyns 2011 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.); Nedbank Ltd. v. Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd. 2012 
(5) SA 497 (S. Afr.); Zoneska Investments (Pty) Ltd. t/a Bonatla Properties (Pty) Ltd. v. 
Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd. 2012 (4) SA 590 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
33 Joubert, supra note 31, at 563. 
34 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd. 
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). The decision and reasoning in this case was 
followed in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) 
SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
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applications in respect of the recovery requirement was that, prima facie, 
the creditor was entitled to a liquidation order, and that only in 
exceptional circumstances would a judicial management order be 
granted.”35 
Having made the above points regarding the significance of the 
difference in the wording of sections 131(4) and 417, the court in 
Southern Palace Investments seems to have lost its course when it not only 
held that, in order to satisfy the lower threshold, the business rescue 
applicant must provide a business plan that: 
Addresses the cause of the demise or failure of the debtor 
company’s business and offers a remedy that has a reasonable prospect 
of being sustainable; 
Provides concrete and objectively ascertainable details of: 
The likely costs of making the company able to resume its 
business; 
The likely availability of the necessary cash resources to enable 
the debtor company to meet its day-to-day expenses upon resumption 
of its operations; 
The availability of any other resources; and 
The reasons why the applicant suggests that the proposed 
business plan would have a reasonable prospect of success.36 
Having indicated that the legislative intent behind the wording 
of section 131(4) was to set the bar lower than was the case in the 
“judicial management” era, the court in Southern Palace Investments ended 
up setting the bar even higher. But perhaps more troubling is the fact 
that the court’s reasoning, with due respect, drifted into the realm of 
blatant error when it decided to impose, by implication, the duty to 
develop and present a sound and detailed rescue plan upon the 
applicant—for this is a duty that is expressly imposed on the business 
                                                 
35 See Southern Palace Investments, 2012 (2) SA 423 at para.  21.  
36 Id. 
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rescue practitioner by the pertinent provisions of Chapter Six.37 
Furthermore, in terms of the minimum three months timeline that the 
Act allows for the practitioner to attempt successful rehabilitation of a 
financially distressed company, a careful reading of the pertinent 
provisions38 would seem to suggest that the practitioner has a 
minimum of four weeks, subsequent to her appointment, within which 
to develop the rescue plan. But perhaps more worrisome is the fact 
that the courts in Southern Palace Investments and Koen v. Wedgewood39 
found that it was fair and realistic to require an applicant for business 
rescue to furnish a complete business rescue plan laden with the level 
of detail spelled out in their judgments as part of the minimum required 
to persuade a court to exercise its discretion in favour of an application 
for corporate rescue. This is because a careful reflection on the profile 
of stakeholders included in the definition of “affected persons” should 
suggest that such business rescue applicants would have neither the 
company-specific information nor the resources required to produce a 
competent rescue plan at the time of making the application under 
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act. The view and attitude adopted 
by the courts in the above two cases smacks of judicial apathy towards 
business rescue applicants which does not bode well for the future of 
the Chapter Six rescue mechanism. 
It is against the above background that the SCA’s decision in 
Oakdene Square Properties40 really does make a welcome entry into the 
corpus of the emerging South African business rescue jurisprudence.41 
In Oakdene Square Properties, the applicants for business rescue, having 
failed in the high court, argued before the SCA that the requirement of 
a “reasonable prospect” for rescuing the company in section 131(4) 
demands no more than a reasonable prospect of development and 
delivery of a rescue plan (by a business rescue practitioner). According 
                                                 
37   Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 140(1)(d)(i) (S. Afr.). It is both surprising 
and unfortunate that the decision in Southern Palace Investments was followed without 
reservation in Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 
(2) SA 378 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
38 Companies Act 71 of 2008 at § 132. The court is conferred with 
discretion to allow a longer time on application made to it by the practitioner. See 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 132(3) (S. Afr.). 
39 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64. 
40 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 (S. Afr.).  
41 Joubert, supra note 31, at 562-63. 
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to them, an applicant for business rescue is therefore not required to 
show a reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals 
contemplated in section 128(1)(b). On this reasoning, all that the 
applicant is obliged to show is that “a plan to do so is capable of being 
developed and implemented regardless of whether or not it may fail.”42 
Furthermore, according to the applicants’ contention, once it is 
established that a business rescue applicant’s intention is to develop 
and implement a plan whose purpose is the rescue of the debtor 
company, the court should grant the application even if it is skeptical 
regarding the potential of the applicant’s plan to achieve the intended 
outcome.43 
The SCA rejected the applicants’ arguments in toto. It held that 
the words “rescuing the company”—as used in section 128(1)(b)—
require the achievement of one of the alternative goals of business 
rescue. To that extent, the Court found that the argument advanced by 
the applicants “is in direct conflict with the express wording of 
s[ection] 128(1)(h).”44 According to the SCA, on a careful reading of 
section 128(1)(b), it is evident that the development of a plan cannot 
be a goal in itself, but rather it can only be the means to an end which 
“must be either to restore the company to a solvent going concern, or 
at least to facilitate a better deal for creditors and shareholders than 
they would secure from a liquidation process.”45 Therefore, the 
evidentiary burden in the view of the SCA clearly lies on the business 
rescue applicant to establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of 
achieving one of the twin goals of section 128(1)(b). 
Fraught with greater uncertainty, and therefore more 
worrisome, is the practical question as to how the business rescue 
applicant ought to discharge the said evidentiary burden. Should this 
applicant present the court with a detailed business rescue plan? Or 
should the applicant provide details of the likely costs enabling the 
company to recommence its business? Or should the applicant present 
                                                 
42 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 31 (S. Afr.).  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  It should be noted that while Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) 
(S. Afr.) defines the term “business rescue,” Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(h) 
(S. Afr.) provides the definition of the term “rescuing the company.” 
45 Id. 
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details pertaining to the likely availability of the cash resources required 
to enable the company to meet its day-to-day expenses? Or yet still, is 
the applicant required to provide concrete factual details of the 
source(s), nature, and extent of the resources that are likely to be 
available to the company as well as the terms on which such resources 
will be made available? In its decision on this practical question,46 the 
SCA made it crystal clear that a business rescue applicant is not 
required to present a detailed rescue plan. However, an applicant must 
present “more than a mere prima facie case or an arguable 
possibility.”47 In this respect, mere speculative suggestions and vague 
averments will not suffice.48 According to the SCA, what is required of 
an applicant is to establish the “reasonable grounds” on which she 
believes that there is a possibility of rescuing the company. Implicit in 
the court’s decision here is that the applicant must provide a factual 
basis for the said grounds. Very significantly, however, the SCA held 
that it would be both impractical and imprudent to prescribe the 
manner in which business rescue applicants must meet this evidentiary 
burden in every case. Accordingly, to the extent that the courts in 
Southern Palace Investments49 and Koen v. Wedgewood50 sought to do so, they 
erred. 
In setting the bar for the applicant regarding what is required 
to discharge the said evidentiary obligation, much judicial caution and 
circumspection is required. This is because if the bar is set too high, 
the practical effect will be devastating for the new business rescue 
regime and the achievement of policy goals it has been enacted to 
promote. Clearly, such a judicial approach will severely limit the 
availability of business rescue proceedings through section 131 of the 
2008 Companies Act. It is noteworthy that this particular danger and 
the underlying concern has already been recognized by the high court 
                                                 
46 Id. ¶¶ 29-31. The SCA here approved and applied the approach adopted 
by the High Court in Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 (4) 
SA 539 (S. Afr.).  
47 Id. ¶ 29. 
48 Id. See also Propspec Investments Ltd. v. Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd. 2013 
(4) SA 539 at para. 11 (S. Afr.).  
49 Southern Palace Investments (Pty) Ltd. v. Midnight Storm Investments (Pt) Ltd., 
2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
50 Koen and Another v. Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate Ltd. 2012 (2) 
SA 378 (WCC) at para. 14 (S. Afr.). 
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in Propspec Investments Ltd. and by the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties 
where it essentially endorsed the approach and related comments of 
van der Merwe J in Propspec Investments Ltd. The judges in both cases 
were of one mind in the view that the bar ought to be set fairly low for 
business rescue applicants, with a view favorable to maximizing the 
availability and use of business rescue proceedings. In this respect, the 
court in Propspec Investments Ltd.51 and the SCA in Oakdene Square 
Properties52 seem to both recognize that a contrary judicial approach 
would be effectively tantamount to judicial frustration of the real 
prospects of attaining the legislative and policy objectives behind the 
enactment of the Chapter Six provisions.53 
The risk of business rescue becoming a victim of a judicial 
approach that is not predisposed to magnanimity towards those 
seeking to access the scheme is not far-fetched. This is because such a 
judicial attitude may be easily justifiable as an appropriate response to 
the real risk of abuse of business rescue proceedings by debtor 
companies and/or their controllers involved in a pattern of conduct 
clearly aimed at improperly defeating or delaying legitimate claims and 
rights of innocent creditors.54 
In some cases, such patterns of behavior have been 
accompanied by evidence of misappropriation or abuse of company 
funds, assets, and/or opportunities by the controller(s) of the debtor 
company.55 In such cases, business rescue proceedings are simply 
activated mala fides to allow the wrongdoing to continue for as long as 
                                                 
51 Bradstreet, supra note 10, at 353-56; Loubser, Tilting at Windmills? The 
Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law, supra note 11, at 372. 
52 Id.  
53 In this respect it is pleasing to note the recent SCA decision in Newcity 
Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow NO and Others 2014 ZASCA 162, where the court 
confirmed its approach and reasoning in Oakdene Square Properties.  
54 This risk of abuse by company directors, majority shareholders and 
other stakeholders has been recognized by other academic commentators. See, e.g., 
Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and 
Questions (Part 1), 3 J. SOUTH AFRICAN L 501, 505 (2010); DELPORT, supra note 7, at 
446; Michael Steiner, The Insolvency Bill 2000: Rescue Culture in the new Millennium, 15 J. 
Int’l Banking L. 61, 62 (2000). 
55 See, e.g., Swart v. Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd., (Four Creditors 
Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (S. Afr.); Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm 
Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 29 (S. Afr.). 
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possible to the maximum detriment of the company, creditors, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Such undesirable behavior and 
tendencies on the part of directors and company controllers are readily 
apparent from the factual findings of the courts in the cases of Oakdene 
Square Properties,56 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd. v. Allan David Pellow and 
Others57 and Swart v. Beagles Run.58 Naturally, the public would expect 
the courts to be very vigilant in ensuring that the Chapter Six 
provisions are not invoked by company controllers or stakeholders 
acting mala fides for purposes that have little to do with achieving the 
underlying policy objectives but, instead, have all to do with wanting 
to co-opt business rescue proceedings into premeditated elaborate and 
illegal self-aggrandizing schemes capable of being perpetrated in the 
corporate context. 
It is in their zeal to prevent the abuse of the Chapter Six 
provisions and related judicial processes that the courts may adopt 
principled positions leading to an unintended consequence, namely, a 
severe restriction of the availability of business rescue proceedings and 
frustration of the underlying legislative and policy intent. This could in 
turn lead to the business rescue model suffering the same fate as that 
which befell judicial management under the 1973 Companies Act. 
Against this background, the SCA decision in Oakdene Square Properties 
and the pronouncements on the applicable legal principles in Propspec 
Investments Ltd. must be applauded. Clearly, business rescue-related 
matters brought before the courts in the coming years will be guided 
by the pronouncements of legal principle made on this critical issue by 
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties. 
                                                 
56 In Oakdene Square Properties, there was evidence of management 
deadlock and related paralysis at the level of the board of directors resulting from the 
active conduct of the two director-shareholders who were the applicants for business 
rescue. In addition, the company had apparently been stripped of its sources of 
income through questionable dealings with its main assets, which were done by one 
of the said directors acting unilaterally without board approval but with the apparent 
tacit support and collusion of his co-applicant. 
57 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 131(4)(a) (S. Afr.). 
58 Here, the facts accepted by the court showed that in the months 
immediately preceding the business rescue application, the company had been 
involved in a pattern of insolvent and fraudulent trading while under the control of 
the sole director-shareholder who was the stakeholder behind the application.  
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B.         What Constitutes “Business Rescue” Under the Act 
According to section 128, which is the opening definition 
section of Chapter Six, “business rescue” means “proceedings to 
facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed 
by providing for”59 among others: 
the development and implementation, if approved, of 
a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its 
affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, 
and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood 
of the company continuing in existence on a solvent 
basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so 
continue in existence, results in a better return for the 
company’s creditors or shareholders than would result 
from the immediate liquidation of the company.60 
In the academic discussions of this particular provision, there 
seems to be consensus that business rescue proceedings are intended 
by the legislature to have both a primary and a secondary objective—
rehabilitating the company so that it is able to continue to operate as a 
solvent going concern being the primary goal, while rehabilitation for 
the very limited purpose of securing better returns for creditors and 
shareholders being secondary.61 The suggestion implicit in the 
academic commentaries is that the proceedings must be initiated solely 
for the attainment of the said primary purpose; and may only turn to 
the pursuit of the secondary purpose after a realization bona fides in the 
course of implementing a properly adopted business rescue plan that 
the primary purpose is unattainable. This was one of the key issues that 
the SCA had to confront in Oakdene Square Properties where the court 
had to pronounce itself on whether a business rescue application under 
section 131 of the 2008 Companies Act could succeed where the 
proposed rescue plan only provides for the pursuit of the so-called 
secondary objective. In other words whether the requirement of 
“rescuing the company” as contemplated in section 131(4)(a) is 
satisfied where it is clear from the outset that there is no real chance 
                                                 
59 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(b) (S. Afr.). 
60 Id. § 128(1)(b)(iii). 
61 CONTEMPORARY COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 864-65; DELPORT, 
supra note 7, at 445-47. 
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of the company being saved from immediate liquidation and that the 
best the stakeholders can hope for is a better return to creditors and 
shareholders than that which would result from liquidation.62 
Before the SCA, the respondents (who were creditors opposed 
to the business rescue application) relied on the dictionary meanings 
of the words “rescue” and “rehabilitate” to argue that the statutory 
definition of “business rescue” in section 128(1)(b) contemplates 
proceedings aimed at the rehabilitation of a company which in turn 
requires that the proceedings must be aimed at achieving the primary 
goal in section 128(1)(b)(iii), which is to restore the company to the 
normal healthy state of solvency.63 In the respondents’ view, the so-
called secondary objective, to provide a better deal for creditors and 
shareholders than liquidation, can only be an alternative goal of the 
proposed business rescue plan. Accordingly, they submitted that a 
proposed plan, such as that in this case, that holds out no hope of a 
return of the company to a state of solvency, but provides at best for 
achievement of the secondary goal, does not amount to “rescuing the 
company” as required by the Act.64 
The SCA held that Chapter Six of the Act, in section 128(1)(b) 
provides its own meaning for the terms “rescue” and “rehabilitate,” 
neither of which coincide with the dictionary meanings of the words 
upon which the respondents sought to rely. In the SCA’s view, 
“business rescue” under the Act means “to facilitate ‘rehabilitation’ 
which in turn means the achievement of one of two goals: (a) to return 
the company to solvency, or (b) to provide a better deal for creditors 
than what they would receive through liquidation.”65 Accordingly, the 
SCA concluded that the achievement of either one of the two goals 
                                                 
62 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 23 (S. Afr.). 
63 In this respect, the respondents urged the court to endorse the approach 
followed by the High Court in the earlier case of AG Petzetakis International Holdings 
Ltd. v. Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (S. Afr.). 
64 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 25 (S. Afr.). 
65 Id. ¶ 26. 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
476 
referred to in section 128(1)(b) qualify as “business rescue” under the 
Chapter.66 
The argument of the opposing creditors in Oakdene Square 
Properties invited the court to adopt a narrow construction of the 
meaning of “business rescue” under the 2008 Companies Act. If 
accepted, such an interpretation would effectively limit the availability 
of business rescue proceedings to those cases where there is at least a 
reasonable prospect of the company being restored to continuation as 
a going concern. Considering the policy goals and public interests 
behind the enactment of South Africa’s business rescue scheme—
especially those pertaining to employment preservation and creation as 
well as protection of vulnerable non-shareholder constituencies such 
as employees, customers, and communities—the restriction of the 
availability of business rescue only to those scenarios where there is at 
least some chance of saving the debtor company as a going concern 
would seem to be prima facie plausible. Indeed, it is arguable that the 
primary public interest rationale behind law and policymakers’ decision 
to establish the business rescue model is to make it available for use by 
companies and stakeholders who find themselves with a financially 
distressed company that has a chance of being restored to its status quo 
prior to its financial woes.67 
However, there are sound reasons why the SCA should be 
applauded for shunning a narrow interpretation of the meaning of 
“business rescue”—preferring instead to adopt a broad, generous 
construction that will ensure the availability of the rescue provisions 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 The socio-economic policy goals and public interests at the heart of 
modern statute-based corporate rescue schemes can be readily gleaned from the 
pertinent primary and secondary sources, including the multiple reports issued or 
commissioned by relevant government departments. See, e.g., CONTEMPORARY 
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 861-64; CHAIRMAN SIR KENNETH CORK, 
INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE, CMND 
8558 (1982); SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, GENERAL NOTICE 1183, supra note 4; 
Anneli Loubser, Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home, 40 COMP. 
INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 152, 152-54 (2007); MCCORMACK, supra note 17, at 18-25. 
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even in those scenarios where liquidation is inevitable.68 In the first 
place, creditors and shareholders, as company stakeholders, are not 
inherently undeserving of judicial sympathy and assistance when faced 
with a debtor that has no reasonable prospect of survival as a solvent 
going concern. Indeed, their role in the sustainable development of an 
enabling environment for companies and entrepreneurs to thrive 
cannot be overemphasized.69 Limiting the availability of business 
rescue by excluding it from scenarios where there is only a likelihood 
of creditors and shareholders receiving better returns than on 
immediate liquidation would amount to adopting a statutory 
interpretation that is patently hostile to these two groups of 
stakeholders, both of whom are indispensable to the sustainable 
growth and survival of the modern company. This is so because the 
narrow definition for which the respondents argued in Oakdene Square 
Properties amounted to stating that business rescue ought not to be 
available where the primary beneficiaries will be creditors and 
shareholders. Clearly, such anti-creditor, anti-shareholder 
interpretation cannot be consistent with the underlying intention of 
the legislature.70 
Furthermore, as the SCA itself pointed out,71 a narrow 
interpretation seeking to limit the availability of business rescue to 
cases where there is a reasonable prospect of restoring the debtor 
                                                 
68 See Richard Bradstreet, Business Rescue Proves to be Creditor-Friendly: CJ 
Claasen’s Analysis of the New Business Rescue Procedure in Oakdene Square Properties, 130 
SALJ 44, 49-52 (2013). 
69 See Bradstreet, supra note 11, at 195. 
70 It should be recalled here that Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.) 
specifically states that one of the objects of the Act is to provide for the efficient 
rescue of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and 
interests of “relevant stakeholders.” To the extent that creditors and shareholders are 
“relevant stakeholders,” any interpretation of a provision of Companies Act 71 of 
2008 Chapter Six that is hostile to their rights and interests without compelling 
justification, including being necessary for the protection of other relevant 
stakeholders’ interests, would actually be inconsistent with the legislative intent 
encapsulated in the wording of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). To the 
extent that the broad interpretation of the meaning of “business rescue” adopted by 
the SCA in Oakdene Square Properties is more consistent with the legislative 
prescription to balance the various stakeholder rights and interests, such an 
interpretation is highly plausible. See Bradstreet, supra note 68, at 49-52. 
71 Oakdene Square Properties Ltd. and Others v. Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) Ltd. 
and Others 2013 (4) SA 539 at para. 26 (S. Afr.). 
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company to financial health as a going concern would be one that 
effectively ignores the historical context out of which the Chapter Six 
provisions originate. Central to that context is the “judicial 
management” model. The pertinent provisions of the 1973 Companies 
Act made the proper granting of a judicial management order 
conditional upon a finding of a reasonable probability that implementation 
of the order will result in the debtor regaining its ability to meet its 
financial obligations in the normal course of things. As indicated 
above, it is now widely acknowledged in both academic and judicial 
commentaries that it was the narrow restrictive meaning attributed by 
the judiciary to those key words that largely led to the abysmal failure 
of judicial management and its replacement with the business rescue 
model under the 2008 Companies Act. As the SCA concluded, it is 
unlikely that the legislature would have intended to repeat the mistakes 
of the past.72 
C.         Status of the Tax and Public Revenue Collection Authorities 
in Business Rescue Proceedings 
The fascinating question of whether the South African 
Revenue Service (“SARS”) enjoys special status in business rescue 
proceedings, as a preferent creditor, has come before the court in 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v. Beginsel NO and Others.73 In 
this case, SARS contended that there was no reason why it could not 
have been specified as a preferent creditor in the proposed business 
rescue plan seeing that section 150(2)(b) of the 2008 Companies Act 
permits such a plan to create and specify the order of preference, in 
which proceeds of property sold pursuant to the plan will be applied 
subject to preferences conferred by the Act in section 135 upon 
different classes of post-commencement creditors.74 The critical issue 
for determination was whether SARS ought to be treated as a preferent 
                                                 
72 Id. ¶¶ 27-28. 
73 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012 
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.). 
74 In requiring that every business rescue plan contain all information 
reasonably required to enable affected persons to decide whether or not to accept or 
reject a plan, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 150(2)(b) (S. Afr.) prescribes a division of 
the plan into three parts: Part A providing a background; Part B setting out the debt 
and business restructuring proposals; and Part C setting out the assumptions and 
conditions on which the plan is based. See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 516-21. 
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creditor for purposes of reckoning its voting interest,75 as well as for 
purposes of distributions of proceeds from disposals of company 
property by the business rescue practitioner. In advancing its case, 
SARS relied heavily on the provisions of sections 96 to 103 of the 
Insolvency Act No. 24 of 193676 (“Insolvency Act”), arguing that it is 
a preferent creditor whose claim ranks ahead of ordinary concurrent 
creditors. Based on section 103(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, SARS 
further contended that because ordinary concurrent creditors are 
included in the class of concurrent creditors who would be 
subordinated in a liquidation referred to in section 145(4)(b) and 
because they would receive nothing on liquidation of the company in 
the instant matter, they (ordinary concurrent creditors) had no voting 
interest at the creditors’ meeting.77 
According to the court, the meaning and practical implication 
of the argument advanced by SARS is that while SARS, as preferent 
unsecured creditor, would have had a voting interest equal to the value 
of its claim against the company, the remainder of the (non-preferent) 
concurrent creditors representing eighty-seven percent of all creditors 
present at the particular meeting would have been disenfranchised 
concurrent creditors under section 145(4)(b). The obvious and 
inevitable result is that the vote of SARS alone would have ensured the 
rejection of the business rescue plan notwithstanding the wishes of the 
substantial majority of the creditors.78 The court held that the 
construction of section 145(4) urged on it by SARS would lead to an 
illogical result that would fail to balance the rights and interests of all 
relevant stakeholders as envisaged in section 7(k) of the Act. In any 
event, according to the court, that interpretation is contrary to the 
ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in the provisions of 
section 145(4). In the court’s view, it is “wholly inconsistent with the 
                                                 
75 Creditors of a debtor company are conferred with voting interests in 
accordance with Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 128(1)(j) (S. Afr.) read together with 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 §§ 145(4) and (5) (S. Afr.). These provisions effectively 
fix a creditor’s voting interest at the value of her claim against the company. Some 
academic commentators have taken the view that, at least for this purpose, it is 
immaterial whether a creditor’s claim is secured or unsecured. See CONTEMPORARY 
COMPANY LAW, supra note 7, at 903. 
76 Insolvency Act No. 24 of 1936 (S. Afr.), as amended. 
77 Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 2012 
(1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.).  
78 Id. ¶ 21. 
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purpose and scheme of the Act, to include all concurrent creditors 
under s[ection] 145(4)(b) of the Act, thereby almost certainly having 
their voting interests reduced and quite possibly entirely 
emasculated.”79 In this regard, the court agreed with the authors of 
Henochsberg80 that such an interpretation of section 145(4) is grossly 
unfair to concurrent creditors, especially given that they have a greater 
level of interest in the debtor company’s rescue than the secured 
creditors who can fall back on their security interest if the attempt at 
business rescue turned out to be a failure.81 
The practical implications of judicial acceptance of the 
principle advanced by SARS would have been devastating, not only for 
non-preferent creditors generally, but also for the viability and 
attractiveness of business rescue proceedings in scenarios where the 
debtor company is substantially indebted to SARS. By adopting a legal 
position that is consistent with the principles of fairness and equality 
of creditors as against one that unduly places a particular creditor in a 
dominant position by enabling it to wield a casting or controlling vote 
(and thereby allowing it to predetermine the outcome of creditors’ 
meetings), the court clearly signalled its discomfort with positions of 
legal principle that are certain to have the effect of undermining 
inclusive and egalitarian character of the rescue scheme that the 
legislature has established in Chapter Six of the Act. The court in SARS 
v Beginsel deserves to be applauded in this regard considering the fact 
that, under South Africa’s tax and insolvency laws and related 
jurisprudence, granting preference to the claims or legal position of 
SARS is the norm rather than the exception. In this respect it would 
again have been easily defensible for the court to have aligned itself to 
the claim for preference by SARS ostensibly in defense of the public 
interest in maximizing legal protection of claims and monies owing to 
the national fiscus. It was therefore bold and courageous for the court 
to refuse preferential treatment for SARS in business rescue 
proceedings. The practical significance of this legal position is 
                                                 
79 Id. ¶ 32. 
80 DELPORT, supra note 7, at 509.  
81 See Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v. Beginsel NO and Others 
2012 (1) SA 307 (WCC) at para. 35 (S. Afr.); See also Okkie Blom & William Maodi, 
Demoting SARS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.withoutprejudice.co.za/index.php/issues/item/demoting-
sars?category_id=1.  
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enhanced by the likelihood that it will serve to discourage the granting 
of preference to other state-related claims that may be outstanding 
against debtor companies, such as monies due under municipal and 
environmental legislation. 
D.        Judicial Review and Setting Aside of Resolution of Board of 
Directors Commencing Business Rescue 
As indicated above, the board of a financially distressed 
company may voluntarily place the entity under business rescue by 
adopting a resolution to that effect.82 The Act provides recourse to 
unhappy stakeholders by stipulating that an “affected person” may 
apply to the court for an order setting aside the board’s resolution on 
either one of three grounds:83 
1. That there is no reasonable basis for believing that 
the company is financially distressed; 
2. That there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing 
the company; or 
3. That the company has failed to satisfy the 
procedural requirements set out in section 129 of 
the Act. 
However, in adjudicating over an “affected person’s” challenge 
against the board’s resolution, the Act provides that the resolution may 
be set aside where, “having regard to all of the evidence, the court 
considers that it is otherwise just and equitable to do so.” An 
interesting and important question that arose in the case of DH Brothers 
Industries84 was whether the above provision constituted an additional 
(fourth) ground for invalidating the said resolution of the board on 
                                                 
82 It is required that the resolution be supported by a majority of the board. 
Accordingly, the absence of clear and credible evidence that the majority of directors 
were behind the resolution is fatal. See DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 
2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 16 (S. Afr.) (holding that adoption of the resolution by one 
of two directors constituted a failure to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 
129—which is one of the bases on which the resolution may be set aside).   
83 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(1)(a) (S. Afr.).  
84 DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S. Afr.). 
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which an “affected person” could rely.85 What seems apparent from 
the text of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is that while the court is 
empowered to set aside the board resolution on four grounds, an 
“affected person” is only entitled to premise the application on one or 
more of the three grounds. According to the court in the DH Brothers 
Industries case, it would seem that “an application cannot be based on 
this fourth ground because the application then would not qualify as 
one brought in terms of section 130(1)(a).”86 Given that section 
130(5)(a) essentially empowers the court to grant relief on a cause of 
action which cannot, on its face, be relied upon by an applicant seeking 
to set aside the board resolution in question, the court concluded that 
the said provision creates an anomaly. Taking the view that “the 
distinction between s 130(1)(a) and s 130(5)(a) clearly arises from a 
drafting error,” the court in DH Brothers Industries held that, “the only 
sensible meaning which avoids the absurdity which would otherwise 
result is to construe the just-and-equitable basis as an additional 
ground to the three listed in s 130(1)(a).”87 The result is that it can be 
relied upon as a fourth ground or cause of action by an “affected 
person” seeking relief under section 130(1)(a).88 
Section 130(5)(a) specifically requires a court to consider all of 
the evidence before reaching a decision on the just and equitable 
ground. In the DH Brothers Industries case, the court held that the 
following were factors that must be considered: 
 Whether the business rescue plan was properly 
adopted; and 
 The terms of the plan and, in particular, whether it 
contains any offensive provision.89 
                                                 
85 This issue was addressed by the court in DH Brothers Industries, 2014 (1) 
SA 103,  because the applicant-creditor specifically relied on the “just and equitable 
provision” of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 130(5)(a)(ii) (S. Afr.). 
86 Id.  
87 Id. ¶ 18. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. ¶ 19. It is submitted that there are at least two additional factors that 
courts should in this context recognize as relevant, namely: (a) whether there are any 
real prospects of a successful rescue given the debtor-company’s circumstances; and 
(b) whether there is any evidence of the directors acting mala fides. 
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The manner in which the court in DH Brothers Industries 
resolved the anomaly and potential conflict created by the provisions 
of sections 130(1)(a) and 130(5)(a) is jurisprudentially significant in 
more ways than one. First, the court’s decision effectively enlarged the 
provisions of section 130(1)(a) by explicitly making available a fourth 
additional ground that may be invoked by company stakeholders 
seeking to prevent a financially distressed company from being 
voluntarily placed under business rescue by its directors. Second, given 
the omnibus, open-ended (catch-all), and amorphous nature of the 
just-and-equitable ground, the decision in DH Brothers Industries 
significantly strengthens the hands of creditors who comprise the 
stakeholder group more likely to be opposed to business rescue while 
similarly weakening the prospects of such a board resolution surviving 
judicial scrutiny. It is submitted that, at least on the face of it, this 
decision is not supportive of the institution of business rescue. 
E.         Legality of Contents of Plan: Appropriateness and Validity of 
a Provision Effecting Compulsory Cession of Part of 
Creditors’ Claims 
In the DH Brothers Industries case, part of the fact complex was 
that the opposing creditor who sought an order setting aside the 
board’s resolution placing the debtor company under business rescue 
was owed a debt of approximately R 5,000,000, which was secured by 
deeds of suretyship provided by the company’s two directors (who 
were also the only shareholders). The plan put forward by the business 
rescue practitioner provided for the creditor to (a) receive 12.25% of 
the face value of its claim as a dividend; and (b) cede (transfer) 75.75% 
of its claim to a share trust established for the exclusive benefit of the 
company. The applicant creditor contended that, to the extent that the 
plan provided for a compulsory cession of a substantial part of its 
claim, it was not the kind of plan envisaged under the Act, especially 
given that the applicant would be rendered unable to recover the ceded 
portion of its claim from the directors who acted as sureties for the 
company.90 
It is noteworthy that none of the provisions of the now famous 
Chapter Six speaks to the effect, if any, of business rescue proceedings 
                                                 
90 Id. ¶ 64. 
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on the liability of persons who had in the period preceding the 
commencement of the proceedings furnished deeds of suretyship on 
the debtor company’s behalf.91 Interestingly, section 155(9) of the Act, 
which is located in the same Chapter Six, specifically provides that the 
adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect on 
the liability of a person who is a surety of the company.92 In this 
respect, the applicant submitted that, given that all creditors are bound 
by an adopted plan irrespective of whether or not they voted in favor, 
the legislature would have included a provision similar to section 
155(9) if it had been within its contemplation that compulsory cessions 
of creditors’ claims could properly form part of a business rescue plan. 
With respect to compulsory partial or total forfeiture of 
creditors claims and/or related rights, the court in DH Brothers Industries 
noted that Chapter Six of the 2008 Companies Act only provided for 
(a) partial deprivation or forfeiture on the part of creditors who 
consented to the discharge of their debt in whole or in part93 and (b) 
enforcement of pre-business rescue debts to the limited extent 
permitted by the terms of an adopted rescue plan.94 Against the 
background of these two provisions, the court held that “any provision 
in a plan which goes beyond a voluntary discharge of the whole or part 
of a debt is not competent.”95 After noting that the plan in this case 
went far beyond what was permitted by the pertinent provisions of 
sections 152 and 154 and emphasizing the well-established 
presumption in South African law against any deprivation of rights by 
legislation, the court concluded that “it must follow as night follows 
                                                 
91 Interestingly, Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 155(9) (S. Afr.), which section 
is located in the same Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.), specifically 
provides that the adoption of a scheme of arrangement or compromise has no effect 
on the liability of a person who is a surety of the company. 
92 Companies Act 71 of 2008 Chapter Six (S. Afr.) consists of twenty-eight 
sections laid out in five parts (A-E). It is interesting to note that only part E, 
consisting of only one section, deals with the subject of “compromise between 
company and creditors.” 
93  See id. § 152(4). 
94  Id. § 154(2). 
95  DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 
67 (S. Afr.). 
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day that a plan which deprives non-acceding creditors of the right to 
enforce a claim against a surety does not pass muster.”96 
Most interestingly, this is one issue on which the court in DH 
Brothers Industries agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of the 
court in the earlier case of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd. v. 
Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd.97 In the latter case, the applicant 
creditor bank maintained that the fact that the board of the debtor 
company resolved to place it under business rescue could not deprive 
it of its right to pursue the directors as sureties pursuant to the 
suretyships they provided in the period preceding commencement of 
business rescue. However, the practitioner took a different view, 
similar to that of the shareholders who happened to be the same 
directors and sureties in question. Accordingly, the bank sought a 
declaratory order that the adoption of a business rescue plan, with 
respect to a company placed under business rescue, would not affect 
the rights a creditor has under suretyships executed with respect to 
amounts owed by the company under business rescue. The court held 
that there was no express provision in Chapter Six providing that the 
adoption of a business rescue plan will deprive creditors of the 
company of their rights as against sureties for the company’s debts.98 
The court concluded that there need be no connection between a 
surety and either the company in financial distress or the stakeholders, 
and that whether or not a creditor is entitled to pursue a surety will, in 
the ordinary course, have no bearing on the prospects of rescuing the 
company. Thus, in the court’s view, the interests of sureties do not fall 
within the scope of the objectives of the business rescue regime. In 
this regard, it relied on the sentiments of Rogers AJ in Investec Bank Ltd. 
v. Bryuns,99 where the court decided that section 133 (2) explicitly 
referred to the stay of suretyship undertaken by the company and not 
a suretyship undertaken by a third person for the indebtedness of the 
                                                 
96  Id. ¶ 67. 
97 African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) 
Ltd. and Others 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.).  
98 Id. ¶¶ 68-69. The court also opined that: “If the legislature intended that 
the adoption of a business rescue plan would have such a far-reaching consequence, 
the legislature would have expressly provided for this consequence . . . . There is, 
furthermore, no basis to suggest that such a provision could be read into the business 
rescue regime.”  
99 Investec Bank Ltd v. Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) (S. Afr.). 
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company. Accordingly, the court in African Banking Corporation held 
that the adoption of the plan would not affect the opposing creditor 
bank’s claim against the debtor company’s directors as sureties for the 
debts of the company. 
The overwhelmingly pro-creditor position and perspective 
adopted by the courts in the three cases mentioned above are both 
plausible and justifiable on a number of grounds. First, it prevents 
abuse and opportunism in the context of business rescue proceedings. 
This is because, as observed by the court in African Banking Corporation, 
there is no functional link between the policy goal of ensuring success 
for the process of rescuing a financially distressed company and the 
continuation or cessation of the liability assumed by persons who 
provided suretyships in support of the company’s pre-business rescue 
debts. Allowing such sureties to essentially “free-ride” on the business 
rescue proceedings to abandon their contractual obligations (as was 
attempted by the two directors in DH Brothers Industries) smacks of 
opportunism and unjust enrichment, which is the kind of conduct or 
behavior that the courts are expected and indeed duty bound to 
discourage.100 Second, it is required of the courts to strive to maintain 
a careful balance between the relevant stakeholders’ interests in the 
business rescue context.101 The development of jurisprudence that is 
accepting of business rescue plan provisions aimed at advantaging 
sureties by terminating their obligations under the suretyships merely 
because the debtor company has been successfully placed under 
business rescue inappropriately skews that balance against company 
creditors and their interests. This is especially problematic given that 
the impugned terms of the rescue plans in DH Brothers Industries and 
African Banking Corporation sought to effectively negate existing 
contractual rights of company creditors and actually did so in a manner 
that was akin to “expropriation” of property rights without 
compensation. Such jurisprudence does not belong in the corpus of 
contemporary South African company law. Third, permitting terms in 
                                                 
100 Not surprisingly, the court in DH Brothers Industries found the provisions 
of the business rescue plan aimed at the compulsory, non-consensual nullification of 
the two shareholder-directors’ obligations under suretyships held by a number of the 
creditors to be both offensive and constitute a basis on which it could be properly 
concluded that it was “just and equitable” to set aside the proceedings. See DH 
Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 at para. 68 (S. Afr.). 
101 Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 7(k) (S. Afr.). 
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business rescue plans that seek to, inter alia, terminate suretyship 
obligations could undermine the integrity and credibility of the entire 
corporate rescue regime by creating space and incentives for collusion 
between business rescue practitioners and sureties aimed at improperly 
benefiting the latter. 
CONCLUSION 
Prima facie, the fact that there have been significantly more 
adverse judicial decisions on business rescue applications than those in 
favor may be troubling for law and policy makers and their supporters 
desperate to see the firm establishment of South Africa’s corporate 
rescue model as well as the rapid entrenchment of a similarly 
supportive judicial culture. Obviously, such a culture would be one that 
is hostile to the idea of liquidating companies that have the slightest 
prospects of rehabilitation, especially where, as in DH Brothers Industries, 
there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith on the part of either the 
business rescue practitioner or the “affected persons” supporting the 
business rescue plan.102 Shareholders, employees, trade unions, and the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission are certain to be 
among those stakeholders already getting concerned about the very 
poor success rate of business rescue applications thus far. 
This apparently poor start to the tenure of Chapter Six can be 
considered problematic from another perspective, namely, that it may 
lead to the proliferation of a perception among stakeholders that the 
courts are generally not supportive of, or favorably disposed toward, 
business rescue applications. This perception may in turn create a 
chilling effect through the under-utilization of the mechanism due to 
the emergence of widespread belief that applications for business 
rescue proceedings by “affected persons” are not worth the inevitable 
investment of time and resources because of their limited prospects of 
success. Perhaps more importantly, the resulting decline in enthusiasm 
and support for the business rescue mechanism could significantly 
                                                 
102   In this respect the unmistakeable pro-rescue disposition of the courts 
in India is of great interest and, from a South African perspective, probably worth 
emulating. See Kristin Van Zwieten, Corporate Rescue in India: The Influence of the Courts, 
1 J. CORP. L. STUD. (Forthcoming 2015). 
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undermine the prospects of Chapter Six achieving the socio-economic 
public policy goals intended for it by the legislature. 
However, it is arguable that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
courts’ decisions on business rescue applications have been generally 
negative, the rulings and interpretive positions they have taken on most 
of the pivotal questions and issues can be said to be business rescue-
friendly and therefore supportive of the future development of the 
mechanism. In this respect, the decisions and reasoning in the cases of 
Oakdene Square Properties, Beginsel NO v. SARS, and African Banking 
Corporation should be applauded in the hope that courts will 
enthusiastically follow them in future cases. 
Finally, judgments are also beginning to clearly show that there 
are significant gaps in the framework and provisions of Chapter Six in 
terms of both the omission to make express provisions on what are 
important and foreseeable business rescue-related issues and the poor 
drafting quality of those provisions.103 The result is that in the coming 
years South Africa is likely to see sharply contrasting judicial decisions 
as already appears from cases dealing with the question of “reasonable 
prospect of rescue.” Accordingly, for the early years of the regime’s 
implementation, company stakeholders, business rescue practitioners, 
and their legal advisers will have to contend with a significant degree 
of uncertainty in this area of contemporary South African company 
law.104 
                                                 
103   This has come out most starkly in the context of the litigation around 
the “binding offer” provisions of Companies Act 71 of 2008 § 153(1)(b) (S. Afr.) in 
the two cases of African Banking Corp. of Botswana Ltd. v. Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd. and Others, 2013 (6) SA 471 (S. Afr.) and DH Brothers Industries v. Gribnitz 
NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (S.Afr.). In the latter case, Gorven, J. lamented the 
drafting-related weaknesses of the Chapter Six provisions in no less than two 
paragraphs of his judgment.  
104   See DELPORT, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting, two years before the 2008 
Companies Act came into operation, that it will pose multiple problems that are likely 
to “cause uncertainty in its application”); Anneli Loubser, The Business Rescue 
Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2), 4 J. SOUTH 
AFRICAN L. 689, 701 (2010) (calling for legislative intervention by way of amendment 
of the pertinent provisions as a matter of urgency because of “the many unclear, 
confusing and sometimes alarming provisions.”). 
